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BidTaker: An Application of Multi-Attribute 
Auction Markets in Tourism 
Martin Bichler 
IBM T. J. Watson Research Center 
Abstract: Recent years have seen an enormous increase in the role of information 
technology in markets. During the past few years, economists, game theorists, and 
computer scientists have started to take a direct role by designing various kinds of 
market mechanisms for electronic markets in various industries. What is so spe-
cial about "electronic" market design is the fact that a designer has many more 
possibilities in designing a mechanism than one would have for physical markets. 
Multi-attribute reverse auctions are such a new market mechanism, which would 
hardly be feasible without the use of information technology. In this paper we de-
scribe a first application of a multi-attribute auction market in the tourism indus-
try.  
Keywords: Electronic Market, Multi-Attribute Auction, Dynamic Pricing  
1 Introduction 
Hundreds of auction sites and online exchanges havesprung up in the past couple 
of years in business-to-business (B2B) as well as business-to-consumer (B2C) 
markets, but the market mechanisms used do not always ork well. In conven-
tional auction markets, there is usually competition only in a single dimension: 
price. But in most markets, price is only one of many dimensions in which suppli-
ers compete. Most procurement markets for goods and services in fact have imper-
fect competition and suppliers compete with similar but slightly differentiated 
products. Conventional procurement or reverse auctions are not a good solution in 
these situations, since they only compare prices. 
Tourism is a good example and a particularly intersting application domain. The 
products and services offered in this industry are not homogeneous. For example, 
the offerings a tourist gets nowadays from an online reservation system differ in 
numerous attributes such as location, time, board, amenities and price. Therefore, 
conventional procurement auctions, where accommodation providers bid on price 
alone, would lead to inefficient outcomes in these situations. New dynamic pricing 
mechanisms have a high potential impact in this field. This is particularly inter-
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esting, since tourism is the biggest and fastest growing industry in electronic 
commerce [ETM00].  
In this paper we focus on the design of a multidimensional auction market for the 
tourism industry. The core of our approach are multi-attribute reverse auctions 
[BiKl00; Bich00]. These new market mechanisms allow automating negotiations 
with multiple suppliers on multiple attributes. In other words, they enable custom-
ers to select the "best" bids based on their preferences. The approach is based on 
methods from economics, decision analysis and computer science and enables 
support for complex negotiations on electronic tourism markets. 
In the next section we describe a number of phenomea that can be observed on 
electronic markets, namely the trend towards dynamic pricing concepts and sup-
port for complex negotiations. Based on this, we introduce multi-attribute auctions 
in section 3. Section 4 provides an overview of relevant data about the tourism in-
dustry and the industry participants, and section 5 describes the implementation of 
a multi-attribute auction market for the tourism industry. To our knowledge, this is 
the first real-world implementation of this kind. Finally, section 6 provides 
conclusions and an outlook on future research. 
2 Dynamic Pricing of Complex Goods 
The following sections will describe two basic phenomenas that can be observed 
on electronic marketplaces. The first trend is the move to dynamic pricing, where 
prices and resource allocation are determined based on the bids of market partici-
pants. This can be seen on most electronic markets nowadays, which utilize con-
ventional auction mechanisms in order to automate price negotiations. The second 
trend is relatively new, but inevitable when it comes to trading complex goods, 
namely support for multi-attribute negotiations.  
2.1 Towards Dynamic Pricing 
Up until now, most electronic commerce has involved fixed price transactions. For 
stable markets or for day-to-day, low-involvement purchases where the stakes are 
small, the predictability and low transaction costs as ociated with fixed pricing are 
more compelling for the consumer. Two trends in electronic commerce are caus-
ing a shift from fixed to dynamic pricing for both business-to-consumer and busi-
ness-to-business electronic commerce. First, price uncertainty and volatility have 
risen and the Internet has increased the number of customers, competitors and the 
amount and timeliness of information. Some empirical evidence for this hypothe-
sis can be found in Brynjolfsson and Smith [BrSm99]. Businesses are finding that 
using a single fixed price in these volatile Internet markets is often ineffective and 
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inefficient. Second, the Internet has reduced the transaction costs associated with 
dynamic pricing by eliminating the need for people to be physically present in 
time and space to participate in a market [Stro00]. The conclusion is that more ne-
gotiations can be expected to take place in electroni  markets than in traditional 
markets. Certainly, fixed pricing will never disappear, but the Internet is changing 
the balance in favour of dynamic pricing.  
This shift from fixed pricing to dynamic pricing isexpected to be most evident in 
the business-to-business electronic commerce. Forreste  Research predicts that 
business-to-business Internet auctions will grow to US $52.6 billion by 2002, 
while analyst Vernon Keenan [Keen00] forecasts thatin the same period dynami-
cally priced business-to-business transactions will rise to US $88 billion, repre-
senting 27% of the value of all business-to-business electronic commerce transac-
tions. 
2.2 Classic Single-Sided Auction Formats 
Auctions are the most widely used form of dynamic pricing mechanism. They 
have been defined as "a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining 
resource allocation and prices on the basis of bidsfrom the market participants" 
[McMc87]. The competitive process serves to aggregate the scattered information 
about bidder’s valuations and to dynamically set a price. In an auction a bid taker 
offers an object to two or more potential bidders who send bids indicating willing-
ness to pay for the object [MiWe82].  
Four basic types of auctions are widely used and analyzed: the ascending-bid auc-
tion (also called the open, oral, or English auction), the descending-bid auction (or 
Dutch auction), the first-price sealed-bid auction, a d the second-price sealed-bid 
auction (also called the Vickrey auction). Oral or open-cry auctions reveal price 
quotes and require public and adjustable bids. After a certain elapse time the auc-
tion clears, meaning it matches buyers and sellers and determines the price. 
Sealed-bid auctions do not reveal price quotes and require private, committed bids 
which are opened simultaneously. The highest bidder acquires the object and pays 
the seller her own bid price in a first-price sealed-bid auction, and pays the second 
highest bid price in a second-price or Vickrey auction. (see [Wolf96] for a more 
detailed review).  
2.3 Support for Complex Negotiations 
Auctions are particularly robust forms of negotiation protocols. In cases where no 
one person knows the true value and each individuals estimate may be highly im-
perfect, the clearing price is still an accurate value estimate. The competitive proc-
ess serves to consolidate the scattered information b ut bidder’s valuations. The 
classic single-sided auction formats are primarily a means to negotiate prices. The 
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products in question are pre-specified in all their qualitative attributes at the out-
set. This has already lead to a tough price competition amongst suppliers in many 
markets.  
These developments have caused many suppliers to differentiate their products 
and services and to look for profitable niches in a way that defies comparison 
shopping by price alone [Vari96]. Nowadays, many goods are wrapped up in ser-
vice. For instance, when buying a car customers get fre  servicing, insurance and 
perhaps only temporary leasing, etc. In addition to this, as Internet commerce 
matures beyond books, software and CDs towards higher valued items such as fi-
nancial services and business services, price becomes less important and negotia-
tion on multiple attributes becomes necessary. Of course, conventional procure-
ment auctions are far from optimal in these situations, as the customer will be 
comparing increasingly differentiated products. Therefore, many marketplaces re-
quire the design of completely new negotiation protoc ls.  
During the past few years, several research labs and start up companies have pro-
posed new mechanisms to automate negotiations on heterog neous goods. Many 
approaches focus on support for bilateral negotiations. For example, TradeAccess 
(http://www.tradeaccess.com) provides a commercial negotiation support system 
for strategic bilateral procurement negotiations. Haggleware 
(http://www.haggleware.com) offers a one-to-one negotiation solution with an 
electronic salesperson, which, based on current product supply and demand, ne-
gotiates on behalf of the seller with a buyer, factoring in buyers' bid history, prod-
uct interest, negotiation skill and buying credibility. Besides, there are numerous 
approaches from academia for so called “negotiation support systems” [Kers98]. 
In our previous work we have focused on multi-attribute reverse auctions (see 
[Bich01; Bich00; BiKl00] for details). Multi-attribute reverse auctions are an ap-
proach to supporting multilateral procurement negotiati ns on multiple attributes 
of a deal. Compared to bilateral negotiation support tools multi-attribute auctions 
leverage the power of competition in order to achieve fficient results.  
3 Multi-attribute Auctions 
Several authors have analyzed tenders and procurement auctions (see [Vick61] or 
[DaSp89]). These auctions are mostly deployed in governmental or corporate pro-
curement where a bid taker auctions off goods or services she wants to buy. Those 
studies have generally assumed that the qualitative ttributes are fixed prior to 
competitive source selection - hence bidding competition is restricted to the price 
dimension.  
Purchasing managers have their own preferences for product quality, price, terms 
of payment and delivery and they are looking for the offer that best satisfies these 
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preferences. The overall utility of a deal for the buyer contains not only the price 
of the item but a combination of the different attributes. In contrast to sales or 
forward auctions the bids submitted in tenders often comprise heterogeneous 
goods or services and the bid taker has the burden to select the “best” bid.  
3.1 Description of the Mechanism 
The negotiation situations we investigate describe heterogeneous monopsonies 
with a single buyer and multiple sellers where the traded goods have several ne-
gotiable attributes and the buyer has certain preferences about these attributes. It is 
important in these situtations to give a bidder explicit instructions on how to im-
prove or optimize her bids. If a bid taker does not provide these instructions, this 
will lead to unguided bidding and potentially inefficient results. In our approach, 
called “multi-attribute auctions”, we assume that the buyer reveals a scoring func-
tion to the bidders based on her utility function. That is, a buyer first has to define 
her preferences for a certain product in the form of a private utility function. This 
might not be feasible or desirable in all cases (e.g. if preferences are highly confi-
dential), but it is a good way to guide bidders towards an efficient solution and to 
automate the bidding procedure. After soliciting bids from the various suppliers, 
the mechanism designates the contract to the supplier who maximizes the buyer's 
utility, i.e. who provides the highest overall utility score for the buyer. 
We next introduce some terminology and notation. A buyer solicits bids from m 
firms. Each bid specifies an offer of price and multiple quality dimensions, at 
which a fixed quantity of products with the offered quality levels is delivered. A 
bid received by the buyer can then be described as an n-dimensional vector Q of 
relevant attributes indexed by i. The attributes may be any combination of mone-
tary and non-monetary attributes. We have a set B of bids and index the m bids by 






j is the level of 
attribute i. In the case of an additive scoring function S(xj) the buyer evaluates 
each relevant attribute xij through a scoring function Si(x
i
j). An individual scoring 
function, S: Q → R, translates the value of an attribute into ”utility scores”. The 
overall utility S(xj) for a bid xj is given by the sum of all individual scorings of the 
attributes. It is convenient to scale S and each of the single-attribute utility func-
tions Si from zero to one, by weighting the individual attributes. That is, for a bid 
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The problem a buyer faces is to determine appropriate Si functions and wi weights. 
An optimal auction is allocating the deal to the suppliers in a way that maximizes 
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the utility for the buyer, i.e. to the supplier providing the bid with the highest 
overall utility score for the buyer. The function max S(xj) (with 1 ≤ j ≤ m) gives us 
the utility score of the winning bid and can be determined through various auction 
schemes.  
3.2 Multi-Attribute Auction Formats 
Similar to classic auction theory, we consider open-cry and sealed-bid auctions. In 
a first-score sealed-bid auction the winner gets a contract awarded containing the 
attributes xj of the winning bid. Alternatives with the same overall utility are indif-
ferent and the first of those bids is the winning bid. The multi-attribute English 
auction (also first-score open-cry auction) works in the same way, but all bids are 
made available to the participants during an auction period. In a second-score 
sealed-bid auction we take the overall utility achieved by the second highest bid 
Smax-1 and transform the gap to the highest overall utility (Smax - Smax-1) into a higher 
price. Consequently, the winning bidder can charge a higher price. In the first-
score and second-score sealed-bid schemes the auction closes after a certain pre-
announced deadline. In a multi-attribute English auction bids are made public and 
the auction closes after a certain time elapse in which nobody submits a bid. We 
do not consider a generalization of the Dutch auction, as this procedure is more 
difficult to realize in the multi-attribute case. 
In our previous work we dealt with many of these practical issues of multi-attrib-
ute auctions. Bichler et al. [BiKa99] describe a prototypical implementation of an 
electronic brokerage system where we utilized conventional MAUT in order to 
determine a buyers' utility function. The implementation leads to a good under-
standing of the problems involved with a real-world deployment of the mecha-
nism. Based on these experiences we conducted a set of laboratory experiments in 
order to learn about the applicability of multi-attribute auctions in the context of 
trading with non-standardized financial derivatives [Bich00]. In these laboratory 
experiments we could show that multi-attribute auctions achieved a significantly 
higher utility score than conventional single-attribute auctions. We could also 
show that the efficiency of multi-attribute auctions was comparable to single-at-
tribute auctions. In a a simulation model we showed that in general multi-attribute 
auctions achieve better results than conventional si g e-attribute auctions, if there 
are multiple attributes that are relevant to the buyer [Bikl00]. In this paper we will 
focus on the application of multi-attribute auctions and our experiences in a par-
ticular field – the travel and tourism industry. 
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4 Electronic Markets and Tourism 
The following section provides some statistical data bout the latest developments 
in the tourism industry and discusses the main stakeholders and their roles. This 
should not only motivate the application domain, but describe the problem and the 
relevant factors in this industry. 
4.1 The Tourism Industry 
According to a 1997 study of the World Travel and Tourism Council [WTTC96], 
the travel and tourism industry is the world’s largest industry in terms of the GDP. 
The study also shows that the relative importance of tourism will grow to ap-
proximately 11% of the GDP in the year 2007 and will be one of the leading in-
dustries in this century, besides IT and telecommunication. A WTO study con-
cludes that there will be no slowdown in the pace of gr wth of international tour-
ism, reaching more than 1 billion in 2010 and 1.6 billions in the year 2020 
[WTO97]. This number corresponds to 7% of the worldwide potential population 
that travels, leaving still some potential for further growth. Europe will continue to 
be the most visited tourism destination in the world with a projected total of 717 
million tourists for the year 2020, that is 382 million more tourists than in 1995, 
although its growth rate is assessed below world average with 3.1% per year.  
According to the European Travel Monitor [ETM00] 13million bookings have 
been conducted online in 1999 and tourism therefore is the biggest online business 
in Europe in terms of turnover. Jupiter Communications states that online travel 
booking will be worth 25.2 billion by 2003 (http://www.nua.net/surveys/). That is, 
online booking of tourist services has become the most popular and revenue gen-
erating transaction in the digital economy. 
4.2 Industry Participants 
The travel and tourism industry can be seen as an umbrella industry, containing a 
set of interrelated businesses, involving travel companies, accommodation facili-
ties, catering enterprises, tour operators, travel g nts, providers of recreation and 
leisure facilities. We distinguish between suppliers, consumer and intermediaries. 
On the supplier side we find primary suppliers and irlines. Among the intermedi-
aries one can find a large variety of services including tour operators, travel 
agents, and computerized reservation systems (CRS) (see [WeKl99] for a more 
detailed description). 
The primary suppliers produce the basic tourism products such as accommoda-
tion, catering, or entertainment. Accommodation facilities are the largest group of 
these. In 1995 12.3 million rooms existed worldwide, including those in hotel 
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chains. The enterprises are mostly small and medium sized. For example, within 
the European Union in the “HoReCa” sector (covering hotels and other accommo-
dation, restaurants, canteens and catering) 95.5% of the enterprises are very small 
(1-9 employees). Travel agents act as a distributor, broker or retailer on behalf of 
the suppliers, their main contact with the supply side is the tour operator.  
CRS have been developed in the 1960’s, acting today as the main electronic inter-
face on the travel and tourism market. They act as a switch between suppliers and 
intermediaries on one side and travel agents on the ot r side. As the result of a 
permanent concentration process four major systems, namely Amadeus, Galileo, 
Sabre and Worldspan have evolved. CRS focus on large hotel chains, which are in 
fact only a small proportion of the overall number of accommodation facilities. 
The Internet offers new opportunities for intermediaries. Several Internet-based 
online reservation systems provide access to services of existing CRS. Others 
build new databases with small- and medium-sized accommodation providers 
which have not been part of established CRS so far.  
The offerings that can be found nowadays in online reservation systems comprise 
fixed prices. Although the suggested consumer benefit of lower prices on the 
Internet may seem intuitively realistic, it is becoming increasingly evident that 
getting a good travel deal on the Internet is by no means an easy task. The results 
of two studies done by Anckar and Walden [AnWa00a; AnWa00b] indicated (i) 
huge variations in price in self-bookings even among highly experienced Internet 
users; and (ii) online bookers being unlikely to compete on price with physical 
travel agents. Hence, it seems to be the case that people using the web are not 
always getting the best deal partly because special fares with restrictions are not 
always advertised online, and partly because this would require some basic 
knowledge about the pricing principles of the travel industry and the strategies 
travel agents use to get a low fare. Therefore, if a tourist contacts them directly 
hoteliers and accommodation providers are often willing to go way below their list 
prices, simply to generate additional revenue. Multi-attribute auctions can be one 
possibility to enable more dynamic ways of pricing goods and services in this in-
dustry. 
5 The BidTaker Auction Market 
Together with TIScover (http://www.tiscover.com), a leading European online 
reservation and destination management system, the Information Systems depart-
ment of the Vienna University of Economics and Busine s Administration has de-
signed and implemented BidTaker, a prototypical multi-attribute auction market 
for the tourism industry. To our knowledge, BidTaker is the first real-world im-
plementation of multi-attribute auctions. Multi-attribute reverse auctions allow 
tourists to define their preferences on all relevant attributes. Then accommodation 
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providers submit their bids, which will be ranked according to the customer's pref-
erences. This solution has advantages for both, customers and suppliers: 
• For customers it leads to time-savings. In the traditional model they have to 
call numerous suppliers in order to find out whether the offers correspond to 
their preferences. This means they have to communicate their preferences over 
and over again. On the BidTaker marketplace customers d fine their preferen-
ces once and a few days later they can choose form a ranked list of tailor-made 
bids.  
• For accommodation providers a multi-attribute auction marketplace allows to 
customise offerings to the individual needs of a certain customer. The 
anonoymity of the marketplace enables them to differentiate among customers 
based on their actual capacity. 
In the following, we will provide a brief overview of the prototype. 
5.1 Software Implementation 
BidTaker is a web application [Kass00] implemented entirely in Java based on an 
Oracle 8i database. The software supports multiple languages and currencies and 
is highly flexible, in that it can easily be customized for different application do-
mains.  
The BidTaker solution utilises a combination of flexible applications designed to 
support the process of finding the right accommodati n. In a first step, accommo-
dation providers have to register with BidTaker over the web. Then the tourist 
specifies her preferences in a multi-step web form. A tourist's reservation for a 
certain accommodation is a complex decision involving multiple attributes such as  
• check in dates,  
• destination,  
• accommodation,  
• amenities, and  
• price.  
For all of these attributes a customer can choose or determine acceptable values 
and determine her preferences for these values (see for example how customers 
can define multiple acceptable check in dates in Figure 1). 
In a final step, the customer determines, how important the individual attributes 
are to him. Then the BidTaker application selects a number of matching accom-
modation providers from the database who satisfy the basic requirements and in-
forms them via e-mail about the new request for bids. Now accommodation pro-
viders can select from a list of requests and submit appropriate bids. The bidders 
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see the preferences of the buyers and improve theirbids in multiple attributes, 
namely dates, board and price. All other attributes such as area, or type of accom-
modation can be taken from their profile in the datab se. Bidders can also deter-
mine the score, a certain bid would achieve based on the preferences of a certain 
tourist (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1: A customer can determine up to three acceptable attributes 
Currently there are two modes of bidding – an open-cry format where the bidders 
know the highest score and a sealed-bid format, where no information about other 
bidders’ bids is revealed.  
After the auction expires, the customers get an e-mail and can access a list of bids 
ordered by score. Customers can get additional information by looking at the pic-
tures provided or clicking on the individual homepages and book immediately (see 
Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Accommodation providers can bid on multiple attributes 
The tourism domain has a number of particularities a ystem designer needs to 
consider. As already mentioned, not all relevant attributes can be considered in the 
scoring function. The look and feel of the hotel or the hotel rooms might be very 
relevant to the decision of a buyer, but it is not c nsidered in the scoring function. 
Therefore, we provide links to the individual homepages in the final list of bids.  
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Figure 3: Selection of bids by the customer 
Nevertheless, the ranking according to the customers’ preferences for check in 
date, area, type of accommodation, amenities, and price is a good decision aid for 
the tourist. It also needs to be analyzed, how wellcustomers know their prefer-
ences. Currently, we provide a tool for them to re-adjust the weights after the bid-
ding if they do not feel comfortable with the rankig of bids. We plan to investi-
gate this issue in more detail in the future. 
6 Conclusions and Future Research 
The design of electronic markets is a challenging task as it has the potential to 
change existing business models. In our previous research we have analyzed 
multi-attribute auctions in general using laboratory experiments and computer 
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simulations. In this paper we have described the application of multi-attribute 
auction mechanisms in a tourism marketplace.  
We think, that multi-attribute auctions can be an important contribution in this in-
dustry. The process of bilateral negotiations with several accommodation provid-
ers is time-consuming and cumbersome. Multi-attribue auctions release the cus-
tomer from having to communicate her preferences several times. Moreover, it 
provides a tool to automatically evaluate the bids. Most important, the customer 
can have the accommodation providers compete against each other in an open-cry 
manner. Accommodation providers in this market on the other hand do not have to 
compete on the price alone. They can bring in their strengths (e.g. location, type of 
accommodation, amenities) and have a better grasp of what their customers really 
want. In general this can lead to more transparency in the market. 
During the next few months we plan to collect and evaluate transaction data from 
this tourism marketplace. Methods from econometrics will play a pivotal role in 
determining and fine-tuning relevant parameters such as the optimal length of an 
auction period or the optimal number of items in a multi-unit auction. This will be 
highly valuable for a further understanding of multi-at ribute auctions. 
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